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Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement in 2015, spurred by the 2018 IPCC Special
Report on Global Warming of 1.5◦C, net zero emission targets have emerged as a
new organizing principle of climate policy. In this context, climate policymakers and
stakeholders have been shifting their attention to carbon dioxide removal (CDR) as
an inevitable component of net zero targets. The importance of CDR would increase
further if countries and other entities set net-negative emissions targets. The scientific
literature on CDR governance and policy is still rather scarce, with empirical case studies
and comparisons largely missing. Based on an analytical framework that draws on
the multi-level perspective of sociotechnical transitions as well as existing work on
CDR governance, we gathered and assessed empirical material until early 2021 from 9
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) cases: the European
Union and three of its Member States (Ireland, Germany, and Sweden), Norway, the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. Based on a synthesis
of differences and commonalities, we propose a tripartite conceptual typology of the
varieties of CDR policymaking: (1) incremental modification of existing national policy
mixes, (2) early integration of CDR policy that treats emission reductions and removals
as fungible, and (3) proactive CDR policy entrepreneurship with support for niche
development. Although these types do not necessarily cover all dimensions relevant for
CDR policy and are based on a limited set of cases, the conceptual typology might spur
future comparative work as well as more fine-grained case-studies on established and
emerging CDR policies.
Keywords: carbon dioxide removal, net zero, climate policy, case studies, typology, socio-technical transitions,
OECD
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INTRODUCTION
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the publication of
the IPCC’s Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5◦C (SR1.5),
numerous political actors have agreed on net zero emissions
targets. This type of long-term target—usually, but not always,
defined as a balance of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and
removals—is emerging as a new organizing principle of climate
policy at almost all political levels. Attempts to operationalize
net zero targets have been accompanied by increasing attention
on the need for anthropogenic carbon dioxide removal1 (CDR)
to achieve these targets (Geden, 2016a; Fuss et al., 2020). The
importance of CDR would increase further if pathways involving
net-negative emissions are pursued in order to recover carbon
budgets consistent with temperature goals after they are exceeded
(IPCC, 2018).
The scarce but growing academic literature on the governance
of CDR has shown that the configuration and design of CDR
policies, as well as their interactions with other climate policies,
have important implications for the role of CDR in the transition
toward net zero emissions societies (Bellamy et al., 2019;McLaren
et al., 2019; Geden and Schenuit, 2020). Based on a comparison
of nine case studies, this article attempts to track the extent
to which CDR policies are already part of domestic climate
policy regimes and how the integration of CDR is evolving.
While the transition of international climate governance toward
a bottom-up, polycentric, and performative climate governance
unfolds (Aykut et al., 2020), analyzing the facts on the ground
of transformations toward deep decarbonization becomes even
more important (Victor et al., 2019).
In the process of case selection, we followed four key criteria:
(1) We limit our cases to members of the Organization for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Countries
with high income and high historical emissions are generally
expected to be responsible for a greater quantity of CDR
deployment if distributional equity is taken into account (Fyson
et al., 2020; Pozo et al., 2020). This reflects the expectations
institutionalized in the international climate negotiations under
the United Nations Framework Convention on Climte Change
(UNFCCC). Although the Paris Agreement does not officially
maintain the dichotomy of Annex 1 and non-Annex 1 countries
and has introduced a less rigid distinction between developed
and developing countries as well as other subtle differentiations
(Pauw et al., 2019), aggregate expectations for high-income
countries with historically high emissions to lead on climate
change mitigation continue to shape the negotiations. At the
same time, these countries are expected to have rather high shares
of mid-century residual emissions in hard-to-abate sectors (Davis
et al., 2018; Luderer et al., 2018; Bataille, 2020); challenges to and
high costs of achieving their net zero targets will shift increasing
attention toward CDR. This is not to argue that developments
1See definition by the IPCC, SR1.5: “Anthropogenic activities removing CO2 from
the atmosphere and durably storing it in geological, terrestrial, or ocean reservoirs,
or in products. It includes existing and potential anthropogenic enhancement of
biological or geochemical sinks and direct air capture and storage, but excludes
natural CO2 uptake not directly caused by human activities” (IPCC, 2018).
in other countries with different socio-economic structures, land
resources, and climate policy priorities would be less relevant;
an assessment of those countries is already planned in future
research projects.
In addition to this first criterion, we limit this study
to countries: (2) that have already integrated CDR in their
existing policy mix; (3) in which the adoption of net zero
targets has spurred a debate about the integration of CDR
policies in the climate policy regime, or; (4) in which
developments in niches, e.g., geochemical-based CDR, begin
to put pressure on the existing regime. We therefore have an
intentional bias toward countries that already deal with CDR
and exclude those without CDR policies or emerging debates
about it.
Based on these criteria, we identified the following set of
case studies: the European Union (EU)2 (and three of its
Member States: Ireland, Germany, and Sweden), Norway, the
United Kingdom (UK), New Zealand, and the United States
(US)3. Drawing on the case studies, provided by authors
from each country and updated as of January 2021, we
attempt to explore the varieties of CDR integration into
climate policy regimes and propose an analytical typology
to distinguish between different ways of approaching
CDR politically.
Analytical Framework
To provide a systematic overview of recent developments
in CDR policy across the cases, we developed an analytical
framework consisting of five key dimensions and a template
of questions. The framework is based on the multi-level
perspective (MLP) heuristic of socio-technical transitions
and integrates key findings of academic literature on CDR
policy and governance. The following sections summarize key
elements of the MLP and the CDR governance literature.
Subsequently, we provide a brief overview of how these
perspectives are being applied in this exploratory study to
systematically track and assess CDR-related developments across
the nine cases.
Applying the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP)
to CDR Policies
Research on sustainability transitions has increased rapidly in the
past 10 years (Köhler et al., 2019). The MLP on socio-technical
transitions is one of the most prominent strands of transition
studies. It provides a “middle range theory that conceptualizes
overall dynamic patterns in socio-technical transitions” (Geels,
2011, p. 26)4. While it provides a straightforward heuristic for
exploring transition processes, it should not be misunderstood as
being capable of predicting future trajectories.
We do not attempt to provide a full MLP analysis of all
nine case studies here. Rather, we apply the MLP heuristic to
2The EU as a supranational organization is not a full member of the OECD, but
the European Commission takes part in its daily work.
3Throughout the initial process of case selection, experts from several other OECD
countries were contacted (among them Japan and Canada) to decide whether these
countries would fit into this set.
4For a discussion of middle range theory approaches, see Geels (2007).
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structure our effort to track and compare transitions toward
integrating CDR policy. The advantage of the MLP perspective
is its “relatively straightforward way of ordering and simplifying
the analysis of complex, large-scale structural transformations”
(Smith et al., 2010, p. 441) while still taking into account
macro-political developments and developments in small niches.
This makes the MLP our preferred choice over other more
fine-grained theories5, concepts and heuristics in the—to our
knowledge—first attempt to compare CDR policy development
across countries.
The MLP sees transitions as non-linear processes resulting
from interactions between developments at three different levels:
First, the socio-technical regimes “represent the institutional
structuring of existing systems leading to path dependence and
incremental change” (Köhler et al., 2019, p. 4). Second, the
exogenous socio-technical landscape, which consists of broader
political, economic or demographic “contextual developments
that influence the socio-technical regime and over which regime
actors have little or no influence” (Geels et al., 2017, p. 465).
And third, niche innovations, a level that describes “protected
spaces and the locus for radical innovations” (Köhler et al., 2019,
p. 4) which differ substantially from the currently dominant
system and can put pressure on the existing regime (Geels
et al., 2017). In addition, MLP adds a temporal dimension and
distinguishes between the three phases of emergence, diffusion
and reconfiguration (Geels et al., 2019).
Key strengths of heuristics such as the MLP are their
capacity to identify path-dependencies, lock-in incentives
and power distributions within a current system, as well
as in emerging and diffusing innovation dynamics (Geels
et al., 2017)—aspects that most integrated assessment models
hardly address in their pathways (van Sluisveld et al., 2020).
The strong focus on innovation in MLP should, however,
not lead to an overly optimistic innovation bias; questions
of possible “unanticipated consequences” (Merton, 1936,
p. 894) and “intended but unrealized effects” (Hirschman,
1977, p. 131) should therefore always be part of analyzing
transition processes.
Key Insights From the CDR Policy
Governance Literature
The literature on scientific and technical aspects of CDR is
growing rapidly (Minx et al., 2017) and, since the adoption of
the Paris Agreement, literature on CDR governance and policy-
making has also started to gain traction. Key issues addressed by
scholars are the risk of mitigation obstruction (Morrow, 2014;
Minx et al., 2018; McLaren et al., 2019), and the importance
of policy and target design to address this risk, e.g., through
prioritizing conventional mitigation and separate targets for
emission reductions and removals (McLaren et al., 2019; Geden
and Schenuit, 2020).
5Future research would gain from integrating insights from other strands of the
sustainable transition literature, as well as other concepts developed in political
science such as public policy paradigms Carson et al. (2010) and policy innovation
Jordan and Huitema (2014).
Other important strands of the debate touch on the patterns
of emerging societal debates and their possible polarization
(Colvin et al., 2020) as well as the public perception (Cox et al.,
2020), socio-political prioritization (Fridahl, 2017; Rodriguez
et al., 2020), innovation dynamics (Nemet et al., 2018), incentive
structures for research and deployment (Lomax et al., 2015;
Cox and Edwards, 2019; Fajardy et al., 2019; Torvanger, 2019;
Fridahl et al., 2020; Bellamy et al., 2021) and framings of different
CDR methods (Bellamy and Osaka, 2020; Waller et al., 2020;
Woroniecki et al., 2020). Furthermore, the literature highlights
the role of CDR in integrated assessment modeling and possible
implications for climate policy (Geden, 2016b; Beck andMahony,
2018; Haikola et al., 2019; Workman et al., 2020), negative
implications of deploying large-scale CDR for sustainability and
biodiversity (Buck, 2016; Smith et al., 2019; Dooley et al., 2020;
Honegger et al., 2020), and justice and equity considerations
(Anderson and Peters, 2016; Peters and Geden, 2017; Shue, 2018;
Fyson et al., 2020; Morrow et al., 2020; Pozo et al., 2020).
Especially in political debates, CDR methods are often
separated with the rather ambiguous differentiation of “natural”
and “technological” approaches. As framings of certain CDR
methods have considerable political implications, in particular
the terminology of “natural” or “nature-based” (Bellamy
and Osaka, 2020; Waller et al., 2020; Woroniecki et al.,
2020), we use the analytical and intended to be value-
neutral distinction between ecosystem-based and geochemical-
based approaches6.
Five Dimensions for Observing CDR Policy
The following five dimensions represent an attempt to apply
and bridge the conceptual work of the MLP on socio-technical
transitions with existing research on CDR policy and governance
to provide an analytical framework that allows systematic
exploration of different case studies in a comparable way (see
Table 1).
While the dimensions (1) institutional setting, actors,
and coalitions, (3) policy instruments and (4) expert bodies
and science attempt to explore key aspects of the MLP-
levels socio-technical regimes and exogenous socio-technical
landscape, dimension (5) particularly focuses on observing niche
innovations. Dimension (2) CDR accounting andmethods covers
important aspects on definition, accounting and framings raised
by the emerging academic CDR governance literature.
Limiting the comparison to these five dimensions means that
neither all dimensions of MLP can be covered, nor can all aspects
of CDR literature be fully represented. But this rather narrow
and straightforward analytical framework enabled the systematic
collection and comparison of facts on the ground in nine cases
in this study. Analyses based on this material, however, must
consider its limitations.
6While ecosystem-based methods refer to deliberately exploiting and enhancing
sink functions of ecosystems, geochemical-based CDR describes CO2 capture
from the atmosphere through technical devices and geological storage. Some CDR
methods, such as BECCS, are hybrid forms, see e.g., UnitedNations Environmental
Program (2017). Note that ecosystem-based methods are not necessarily positive
for wider ecosystem services and biodiversity, as this depends on their mode and
scale of implementation.
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• Overall institutional and political setting in domestic climate
policy (incumbent regime)
• Macro-political developments that influence CDR debate
[e.g., Paris Agreement, Sustainable Development Goals
(SDGs), …]
• Actors and coalitions in CDR-related climate policy making






• Accounting practices of CDR toward domestic climate
targets and its relation to gross emission reductions
• Methods addressed and differences in accounting
• Groupings/separation and framings of different methods
(e.g., “technological”/vs. “natural” CDR)




• Timing and broader political circumstances
• Political struggles in public policy processes (main critique
vs. justification patterns)
• Relation to other climate, environmental and sustainability




• Role for expert bodies and science more generally in societal
CDR debate as well as in public policy processes
• Role of IPCC reports (esp. 5th Assessment Report, SR1.5
and Special Report on Climate Change and Land (SRCCL)
and domestic modeling or technology development
(5) Developments
in CDR niches
• Developments with regard to CDR methods in “protective
spaces” that shield, nurture, empower (Smith and Raven,
2012)
• Emerging business cases
• New actors that demand change in incumbent climate
policy regimes to integrate CDR
CASE STUDIES
The case studies presented in this section were conducted by
experts from each country and followed the analytical framework
presented above (see Table 1). In addition to the dimensions
for observation, a template of guiding questions for each
dimension was provided to the case study author teams to
ensure comparable findings across cases. The five dimensions
also structure the presentation of the highly condensed results in
the following sections.
European Union
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
The European Union (EU) is regarded as a key frontrunner
in international climate policy and was a driving force behind
the Paris Agreement. Among its Member States and between
EU institutions, however, the appropriate level of ambition is
contested (Rayner and Jordan, 2016). The EU’s climate policies
are separated into three regulatory pillars: the EU Emissions
Trading System (EU ETS), the Effort Sharing Regulation (ESR),
and the land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)
Regulation (Kulovesi and Oberthür, 2020). While the EU
ETS covers emissions from power stations, energy-intensive
industries and intra-European aviation, ESR sets national targets
for emissions reductions in the transport, buildings, and
agriculture sectors.
Since the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the IPCC
SR1.5, the EU’s executive arm, the European Commission, has
started to address the issue of CDR proactively (European
Commission, 2018). Recent policy initiatives are directly linked
to the new 2050 target of net zero GHG emissions. The European
Parliament and Member State governments in the Council of the
EU—the co-legislators in EU policymaking—are still negotiating,
but it is already apparent that the EU Member States differ
considerably in how they approach CDR politically (see the
case studies on Germany, Ireland, and Sweden). The shared
competence between the EU and its Member States on the
environment and therefore climate policy, combined with path-
dependencies, deep-rooted conflict lines (Szulecki et al., 2016),
and new distributional issues will shape the upcoming decisions
(Geden and Schenuit, 2020). ENGOs are likely to play a vocal
role in this process. Although ENGOs increasingly acknowledge
the need for CDR to achieve the net zero target, their positions
are often critical, especially with regard to what some call large-
scale “artificial negative emissions technologies” (Climate Action
Network, 2018, p. 3). Other advocacy groups have started to
call for integrating CDR into EU climate policy (e.g., Bellona).
Furthermore, governmental and industry representatives of the
Northern Lights project (see the case study on Norway) turned
to the EU to promote cooperation on carbon capture and storage
(CCS), including bioenergy with CCS (BECCS).
CDR Accounting and Methods
The Commission regards CDR as key to achieving net zero GHG
emissions by 2050. Its modeling shows that net zero pathways
require ecosystem- (LULUCF) and geochemical-based direct air
capture and CCS (DACCS) CDR, as well as BECCS as a hybrid
form. At present, the EU does not fully account for LULUCF
removals toward its economy-wide mitigation targets of −40%
by 2030 compared to 1990 levels. In the context of revising the
target (−55%) and its new Nationally Determined Contribution
(NDC) submitted in December 2020, the Commission and the
Member States, however, modified the accounting toward a full
consideration of the LULUCF sink. It is likely that the rather
unspecific differentiation between “natural” and “technological”
CDR will become a controversial issue. ENGOs have invested
substantial political capital in this differentiation, and the
Member States have different socio-political CDR prioritizations
(Geden and Schenuit, 2020).
Policy Instruments
The current 2030 Climate and Energy Framework established
in 2018 includes no distinct CDR policy. However, given the
new 2030 target, this will change by 2022. The current LULUCF
Regulation contains a “no-debit rule” meaning that countries are
obliged to balance any emissions with removals in the LULUCF
sector. To a very limited extent, LULUCF credits can be counted
toward mitigation targets in the ESR sector (Ø 1% of 2005 ESR
emissions). This flexibility, however, was not explicitly framed
as CDR policy, i.e., intentionally incentivizing removal capacities
to achieve an economy-wide mitigation target, but rather as
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acknowledging the hard-to-abate emissions in the politically
influential agricultural sector (Böttcher et al., 2019; Matthews,
2019). For now, explicit CDR policies are only under preparation
by the Commission. Gradually, however, they are being taken up
by the Council and the Parliament. These initiatives focus mostly
on ecosystem-based methods: In its Circular Economy Action
Plan, the Commission announced a regulatory framework for
the certification of CDR by 2023. In its Farm to Fork Strategy,
the Commission proposed to use money from the Common
Agriculture Policy to reward farmers and foresters who sequester
carbon. Apart from that, most existing initiatives are linked
to research and innovation funding. The EU’s Horizon 2020
program funds large CDR research projects and the EU ETS
Innovation Fund (e10 billion) is open for applications from
CDR and CCS pilot and demonstration plants. Furthermore,
the Commission supports new geological storage projects such
as Porthos in Rotterdam and Northern Lights politically and
financially (see the case study on Norway). Almost all climate
legislation is up for re-negotiation in 2021 and 2022 in the context
of upgrading the 2030 target. CDR will likely be addressed in
these revisions, maybe even in the EU ETS (Rickels et al., 2020).
Expert Bodies and Science
The Commission refers to the IPCC SR1.5 and in-house
modeling efforts to justify CDR (European Commission, 2018).
This justification is in line with a paradigm in EU climate policy
that attaches great importance to evidence-based target setting
and policy design (Geden et al., 2018). Concurrently, the EU
plays a key role in funding the production and mobilization
of climate science, in particular, it played a decisive role in
the financing of the integrated assessment modeling community
(Lövbrand, 2011; Cointe et al., 2019)—one of the key gateways
for the diffusion of the CDR issue on the political agenda (Low
and Schäfer, 2020). Although the EU’s long-term strategy models
net negative CO2 in the second half of the century (European
Commission, 2018) and legislation includes language on the need
for it, actual target-setting and other policy initiatives do not
address the issue so far; it is almost exclusively addressed by
climate scientists.
Developments in CDR Niches
With regard to CDR niches, the involvement of the Commission
in CCS projects in the Netherlands and Norway and the funding
opportunities for researching and demonstrating CDR under the
EU ETS Innovation Fund are the most important developments.
In November 2020, three EU Member States (Netherlands,
Denmark, and Sweden) together with Norway published a “Non-
paper on Carbon Capture and Storage” in which they stress the
importance of CCS as well as CO2 removals to achieve the EU’s
goal of climate neutrality (Klima- Energi-og Forsyningsudvalget
Denmark, 2020). Other niche developments can be best observed
at the Member State level (see the case studies on Germany,
Ireland, and Sweden).
Germany
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Germany is often perceived as a frontrunner in crafting
mitigation policies. Since the late 1990, German policymakers
have promoted the “Energiewende” (energy transition) and its
main purpose of supporting the expansion of renewable energy
sources to reduce CO2 emissions. At the same time, its climate
policy is deeply interwoven with EU policy making (see EU case),
occasionally creating tensions between the largest EU Member
State and the EU level (Jänicke, 2017). Although German climate
policy explicitly refers to the net zero GHG target stemming
from Art. 4 of the legally-binding Paris Agreement (German
Government, 2016), the issue of CDR to balance residual
emissions is not explicitly addressed. This holds also true for the
Climate Law adopted in 2019. Neither the balancing of residual
emissions nor net-negative emissions beyond 2050 are addressed
in the law (Bundesgesetzblatt, 2019).
After the German government decided to follow the EU
Commission’s proposal to set a net zero GHG emissions target
in 2019, the fact that achieving net zero target requires removals,
both ecosystem-based and geochemical-based got increasing
attention in German climate policy (Prognos, Öko-Institut,
Wuppertal-Institut, 2020). In general, however, the issue of CDR
is approached with restraint. The Free Democratic Party is the
only party in the German parliament calling for a proactive
approach to CDR. The political reluctance is linked to the strong
political path-dependencies created by the energy transition and
the low level of public acceptance of CCS (Dütschke et al., 2016).
However, the acknowledgment that residual emissions must be
balanced to achieve net zero GHG emissions in 2050 is likely to
lead to an intensified CDR debate and incremental modifications
of existing climate policy. ENGOs increasingly acknowledge the
fact that some carbon removal will be needed, and support
for enhancing “natural” sinks is being expressed (Deutscher
Naturschutz Ring, 2020). Their position toward integrating
geochemical-based CDR remains very skeptical. Their main
arguments against the integration are concerns about mitigation
obstruction as well as strong rejection of CCS. The German
industry has so far not been openly calling for the integration of
CDR in future climate policy.
CDR Accounting and Methods
CDR is not yet accounted for in national mitigation targets,
neither natural (e.g., enhanced LULUCF sink) nor geochemical-
based methods (except for limited flexibilities, see EU case).
However, EU Member States including the German government
and the EU Commission now support a proposal of changing the
accounting methods for climate targets at EU level, incl. the 2030
target, toward a “net” emissions logic. Such a reform would then
likely also be implemented in the German climate law.
Policy Instruments
The emerging CDR debate in Germany is shaped by the
differentiation between “natural” and “technological” methods.
Options linked to CCS in particular are quite contested. In
the years before the incremental acknowledgment of the need
for CDR to neutralize residual emissions in the context of
net zero targets, deliberate CDR was not discussed by political
actors but only by climate scientists and usually dismissed as
a form of climate engineering. At the national level, no CDR-
related policy instruments exist yet. The developments at EU
level, however, will shape German climate policy substantially.
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Not only because of EU competencies in climate and energy
policy, but also because it is easier for German policymakers to
elevate a rather controversial issue to Brussels. As the German
LULUCF sink is projected to decrease and turn into a source
of emissions (Umweltbundesamt, 2020) and the existing EU
legislation already requires to adhere to the “no-debit rule” (see
EU case), the development of policies that aim for enhancing
LULUCF removals are to be expected.
Expert Bodies and Science
In the National Energy and Climate Plan 2030, submitted
to the EU in 2020, the German government addresses
both “natural” CDR (“plant growth”) and “technological”
CDR (“direct air capture”). It is being noted that research
will be stepped up (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
Energie, 2020, p. 61). A research initiative is also announced
with regard to the enhancement of the sink function of
soils and forests (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und
Energie, 2020, p. 119). The integration of controversial
topics into the political debate through formalized expert
bodies and research funding is a common approach in
Germany (Jasanoff, 2005). For 2021, the Federal Ministry
for Education and Research announced two large research
funding lines (Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung,
2020a,b).
The debate on CDR entered the policy debate only after
the IPCC’s SR1.5 in 2018. Policymakers in parliament and
public officials in the relevant ministries, however, are still
reluctant. Since the adoption of the net zero target, the debate
is incrementally shifting and a discussion about funding for
researching and developing CDR emerges. So far, CDR measures
were almost absent from domestic modeling efforts (Hahn
et al., 2020). However, first studies on achieving net zero GHG
emissions indicate the need for large-scale geochemical-based
CDR (5% of 1990 emissions) (Prognos, Öko-Institut, Wuppertal-
Institut, 2020). The issue of net-negative emissions in the second
half of the century, however, is only addressed by climate
scientists so far.
Developments in CDR Niches
Due to the aforementioned strong path dependencies in
German climate policy, the support for CDR niches is rather
limited. The new funding lines indicate emerging support
for research and development but not for deployment of
geochemical-based CDR. An increasing amount of German
companies are cooperating with internationally emerging CDR
businesses in order to explore possible ways to achieve voluntary
climate targets, e.g., Audi/Volkswagen with ClimeWorks in
Iceland (VW, 2020). The decreasing LULUCF sink and
existing regulatory obligations might put pressure on German
climate policy regime and could accelerate the support
for niches.
Ireland
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Ireland expresses consistent aspirational support for effective
climate policies, but following the financial crisis of 2008 it
generally prioritized economic recovery. Within the EU’s multi-
level processes Ireland has played a generally constructive
role but resisting high ambition, and maximizing so-called
“flexibilities.” The role of GHG sinks, and specifically forestry-
based sinks, has been part of Irish policy since the adoption of the
Kyoto protocol. Ireland’s compliance with its (relatively modest)
obligations under the first commitment period of the protocol
relied on including accounting for forestry sinks. However,
the overall Irish LULUCF sector continues to be a net GHG
source rather than sink. The government that took office in
2020 tabled a draft for new national climate action legislation,
including a statutory net zero objective for 2050, explicitly
defined as a balance between GHG emissions and removals (Irish
Government, 2020).
Since 2016, after IPCC’s AR5 and the adoption of the
Paris Agreement, there is active discussion of net removals
among a small number of scientific experts, agencies, and
relevant government departments but not apparently extending
to senior ministerial level. Among these, views are very
preliminary, but there is some rough consensus on the need
for strengthening national policy capacity and understanding.
To date, geochemical-based CDR has played virtually no role in
public discourse. AmongNGO actors, CDR is largely viewed with
suspicion and assumed to be a device for mitigation obstruction.
There is active consideration by industry actors in the agriculture
and forestry sectors, focused on potential “credits” (financial or
otherwise) to be gained by accounting of gross removals. The
influential Irish agri-food sector strongly promotes the potential
role of land use removals.
CDR Accounting and Methods
Current national policy ring-fences any removals attributable
to forestry as implicitly contributing to a 2050 approach to
GHG neutrality within the agriculture, forestry, and other land
use (AFOLU) sector, separate from all other sectors. The new
legislation would, if enacted, supersede this by establishing
an integrated economy-wide GHG neutral by 2050 target.
Afforestation is incentivised, but Ireland is characterized by low
existing forest cover and afforestation rates have consistently
fallen short of targets. Relatively maximal flexibility for LULUCF
removals was also sought under the EU Effort Sharing Regulation
(ESR) for 2021–2030 (see EU case). There is a separation
between discussion of forestry and soil carbon sequestration
as against geochemical-based approaches, partly due to relative
familiarity and deployment maturity, and because the agriculture
sector views the former as tacitly balancing N2O and CH4
under the EU ESR. Bioenergy policy should cut across this:
but current bioenergy development is still assessed in terms
of unabated use in direct fossil fuel substitution, rather than
potential combination with CCS for CDR (BECCS). There is
some ongoing exploration of CCS deployment for fossil fuel
emissions abatement, but not CDR.
Policy Instruments
So far, no explicit CDR policy exists, except for incentivising
private forestry development. But this policy is generally
perceived as primarily about promoting forestry as an economic
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sector rather than climate mitigation. The proposed climate
bill refers to a need for policy flexibility “to take advantage of
opportunities . . . to accelerate the removal of greenhouse gases”
(Irish Government, 2020, p. 9). It also proposes the adoption
of a rolling programme of 5-year cumulative GHG budgets,
though the draft is equivocal as to whether these would be net, or
separated into gross emission and removal components. Perhaps
more significantly, it makes provision for potential allocation
of funding for “projects that seek to increase the removal of
greenhouse gas, particularly nature based solutions that enhance
biodiversity” (emphasis added, Irish Government, 2020, p. 51).
Expert Bodies and Science
In light of AR5 and the Paris Agreement, the Irish Environmental
Protection Agency sponsored a research project to provide a
preliminary assessment of the overall potential for negative
emissions technologies in Ireland (McMullin et al., 2020). From
2017 onwards, reports of the national Climate Change Advisory
Council (CCAC) have started arguing more clearly and explicitly
for enhancement of forestry specifically as mitigation. The most
recent CCAC annual report (Climate Change Advisory Council,
2020) contained, for the first time, a full section introducing
and reviewing the potential role of CDR in Irish climate action.
IPCC’s SR1.5 has contributed to the expert discussion. Especially
to the most recent documents and reports from the Irish Climate
Change Advisory Council. Since then, net zero by 2050 has
acquired a sort of totemic usage. Domestic academic analysis
is starting to incorporate the finite cumulative GHG budget
framing, including downscaling to the national level (based on
explicit interpretations of prudence and equity) and this in
turn is strengthening consideration of CDR (Glynn et al., 2018;
McMullin et al., 2019; McMullin and Price, 2020). The fact that
IPCC scenarios assume large scale global net-negative emissions
(post 2050) has so far received onlymarginal political attention. A
CCAC communication to Government on the subject of setting
national carbon budgets noted that any overshoot or exceedance
“will have to be recovered with negative emissions” (Climate
Change Advisory Council, 2019, p. 2). It is unclear if this message
is yet seriously percolating into national policy thinking, and
is not an aspect of wider public discourse. But local NGOs are
beginning to raise the issue, particularly in the context of global
and intergenerational climate justice.
Developments in CDR Niches
In general, a perception of Ireland as a technology taker rather
than innovator in heavy industry sectors prevails in Irish climate
policy. From a general industry point of view, interest will remain
very limited unless there are plausibly profitably CDR business
models. The governmental support for developing or deploying
niche CDR methods is therefore rather limited. The new climate
bill, however, might change this perspective.
Sweden
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Sweden has pioneered climate policy development since the
1980s. Around the mid-1980s, it adopted several policies
targeting energy efficiency and, by the early 1990s, became
one of the first countries to instigate a carbon tax. Today,
Swedish climate policy is highly interwoven with EU policies
and Sweden is traditionally one of the EU Member States with
the highest climate ambitions. Although the Swedish political
debate on CDR is old and tied to forestry, it intensified after
the adoption of the Paris Agreement and following a broad
Parliamentary approval of the Swedish climate law in 2017
(Government of Sweden, 2017). The climate law was preceded
by intense debate among researchers, NGOs, and politicians on
the appropriateness of planning for BECCS to contribute to long-
term climate targets. While the Swedish BECCS potential is high,
planning for BECCS, it was argued, could lead to near-term
mitigation obstruction followed by inability to meet the long-
term target if BECCS did not deliver. Policymakers agreed on a
compromise, with separate targets for emission reductions and
so-called supplementary measures.
CDR Accounting and Methods
The separated target structure established by the Swedish
climate law distinguishes between emissions reductions (at least
−85% compared to 1990 levels) and supplementary measures
(maximum 15%), i.e., CDR through targeting additional
enhancement of LULUCF sinks and BECCS (Government of
Sweden, 2016) as well as international offsetting. Supplementary
measures have mostly been justified as a means to provide
flexibility to themilestone targets and to balance hard-to-mitigate
residual emissions in 2045. While all Swedish climate policy is
anchored in the climate law and framework, CDR-related policies
are largely done separately.
Policy Instruments
In 2020, a government committee proposed a strategy to
realize the supplementary measures (Government of Sweden,
2020). Although international offsetting was forwarded as one
alternative, the committee suggested to minimizing offsetting
and to instead focus on BECCS and enhanced LULUCF. The
over 50 actions proposed by the strategy include state-led reverse
auctions for BECCS, improved coordination, increased funding
to afforestation, agroforestry, rewetting of drained peatlands,
and to push for an EU-wide BECCS policy and improved
monitoring and reporting rules. The proposed strategy has
received substantial backing by Swedish industry and civil
society. Some politicians have indicated resistance to subsidized
BECCS, including representatives of the Green Party, while
others have largely reacted with silence. In January 2021, the
Swedish Government tasked the Swedish Energy Agency to
design a support scheme for BECCS to be implemented in 2022
either as a reverse auction or as a flat subsidy (Government
of Sweden, 2021). Forest and energy companies are requesting
policy-induced economic incentives to deploy BECCS and are
also generally of the opinion that biomass may contribute to
decarbonization and negative emissions in many other ways
(Rodriguez et al., 2020). Several NGOs have criticized the strategy
for not capitalizing fully on the potential of enhanced “natural”
carbon sinks.
While forest-based CDR has long been discussed, LULUCF
sinks are not foreseen as the main CDR method; LULUCF
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sources and sinks are reported but unaccounted toward the
climate targets. Taking the LULUCF sink into full account would
enable net zero emissions soon after the mid-2020s, provided
that fossil emissions continue to decline. The proposal is to only
account for additional LULUCF removals that are a direct effect
of new supplementary measures policy and that are not necessary
to meet the no-debit target in the EU LULUCF Regulation
(Government of Sweden, 2016, 2020). In addition to initiatives
in the context of the climate law, policy measures for LULUCF
sinks exist, a few existing policy measures also target BECCS and
biochar. These instruments include the Industrial Leap Scheme
Industriklivet, an investment fund with a specific appropriation
for BECCS RDD&D, and the Climate Leap Program Klimatklivet
and the Rural Development Programme that supports biochar
market introduction. Regulatory clarity on CO2 transport and
storage is also in force, in response to EU regulation (Government
of Sweden, 2014).
Expert Bodies and Science
When the debate on fossil CCS intensified in the late 1990s,
Swedish researchers started exploring BECCS as a source of
negative emissions (Obersteiner et al., 2001; Möllersten, 2002)
and to expand the technology portfolios of integrated assessment
models (Azar et al., 2001). At the time of the approval of SR1.5,
the Swedish climate law had already been passed in Parliament.
By then, the Swedish debate had matured to take note of the high
uncertainties related to BECCS but also to distinguish between
the large trade-offs associated with the widespread BECCS
deployment assumed in many global scenarios and the more
limited but less problem-struck domestic potential for BECCS
(Fridahl, 2018). In the process of designing the separated targets,
domestic modeling played an important role. It was used both
to arrive at the total target quantity for supplementary measures
in 2045, and to argue for bringing the target forward from 2050
to 2045. The Swedish potential for net-negative emissions in the
second half of the century is also discussed in expert circles and
established as a climate objective yet in unspecified qualitative
terms (to achieve net-negative emissions after 2045).
Developments in CDR Niches
Due to strong governmental support for research, development,
and deployment, BECCS is developing quite fast. Most
prominently, Stockholm Exergi, an energy utility, pledges to
become “climate positive” (i.e., net-negative) by 2025, relying on
its own production of biochar and BECCS deployment to deliver
on its pledge. About 10 other companies are also planning to
implement BECCS between 2025 and 2030.
Norway
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Norway’s climate target is to reduce GHG emissions by 50–55%
by 2030 compared to 1990 but does not have a specific net zero
target. By 2050 the ambition is to reduce GHG emissions by
90–95%. The industry and energy sectors are fully integrated
in the EU ETS, whereas other policy instruments are directed
at the transportation, agriculture, buildings, and waste sectors.
According to the EU’s LULUCF regulation, which Norway is
associated with, the no-debit rule applies to LULUCF by 2030
(see EU case). The CDR story in Norway is short, and there is
not much public debate about CDR. However, the CCS story is
longer—stretching back to the 80s in terms of research and mid-
90 in terms of the first industrial application. CCS is not a CDR
approach on its own but needed for BECCS and DACCS. CCS
entered the public debate in the early 1990s, and gained traction
from 1996 onwards after CO2 was separated from natural
gas at the Sleipner platform to make the gas commercial and
geologically stored. The subsequent debate on CCS in Norway
was associated with power production from natural gas. CCS
became a compromise between industrial development based
on natural gas and climate policy. Full-chain CDR operations,
foremost biomass use combined with CO2 capture in industry
and biochar, have only been on the debate agenda for the last
decade, catalyzed by IPCC’s SR1.5 from 2018.
The interest in industry-based CCS has picked up in the
last years, foremost in some energy-intensive industries, to
capture fossil- and process-related CO2 emissions, or to produce
hydrogen from natural gas combined with CCS. These industries
also have plans to replace some of the fossil inputs with
biogenic materials, which would establish a CDR chain. One
example is the planned carbon capture operation at the waste
incineration plant of Fortum Oslo Varme AS. However, so
far little attention has been given to specialized BECCS. The
agricultural sector has taken some interest in biochar and
established a network (Norsk Biokullnettverk, 2020). Technology
focused environmental NGOs accept geochemical-based CDR,
whereas the nature conservation focused NGOs favor ecosystem-
based CDR. Industry groupings and agriculture see themselves as
stakeholders in CDR, but still expect significant public facilitation
in terms of public funding and an improved policy framework.
CDR Accounting and Methods
Norway has had a net CO2 sink through forest growth for
decades but has been cautious to include this in the national
GHG accounting, with a view to the country’s position on sinks in
international climate policy negotiations. In the case of BECCS,
waste incineration, and biogenic inputs for industry with CCS,
removals can be accounted for if these can be subtracted from
emissions of CO2 and other GHG. There is a challenge with
CDR in industry due to the EU ETS, however, since biomass is
included in the baseline (i.e., assumed to be CO2-neutral) and
biomass-based entities are excluded from the trading system.
Policy Instruments
Explicit CDR policies are currently almost absent from
Norwegian climate regulation. So far government financial
support for R&D has been the major policy instrument for
CCS and CDR development. Since Norway is fully linked to
the EU ETS, CDR-related funding from the EU’s Innovation
fund (see EU case) will also provide some CDR incentives
in Norway. As part of a broader debate, one proposal is to
establish a specific fund to catalyze CCS and CDR deployment
in industries. Regarding forestry, in 2016 a scheme for enhanced
carbon fixation in forests was introduced, with economic support
for forest fertilization, denser tree planting, and development
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of improved tree species. Aside from managing the net CO2
sink of forests, there will not be much development on other
CDR methods.
The Northern Lights project, a CCS project to transport
and sequester CO2 from Norway and other countries, is a key
initiative. This project is part of emerging international full-CDR
chains and potentially a component of future CDR business cases
in Norway and beyond.
Expert Bodies and Science
The first actors to push both CCS and CDR into the policy
debate were scientific experts and some NGOs. Aside from an
earlier start in the scientific community, the public attention and
debate first picked up after recent IPCC reports. In Norway, this
awakening has merged with the longer-term understanding of
the need and potential for CCS to reduce GHG emissions, and
Norway being in a promising position to facilitate the required
technology development, not the least regarding storage of CO2.
Developments in CDR Niches
In Norway, several CDR-related CCS projects are emerging,
financed by the government as well as possibly by the EU’s
Innovation Fund. In September 2020, the government launched
the project Langskip, announcing that a full-scale CCS facility
at Norcem Heidelberg Cement, Brevik, will receive close
to full government funding. Furthermore, a full-scale CCS
facility at the Fortum Oslo Varme AS waste incineration plant
will receive almost 50% government funding, contingent on
remaining funding from own and other sources. Parts of
these processes can be regarded as CDR. The Northern Lights
initiative is the third component, in which an infrastructure
for transportation and storage of CO2 under the North Sea
seabed is developed, supported by Equinor, Shell, Total, and
the Norwegian government. Companies from other European
countries are invited to join. So far, companies from Norway, the
UK, the US, Ireland, Sweden, Belgium, France, and Germany,
have expressed an interest. More generally, there is wide-
spread industrial interest in Norway to reduce industry-related
CO2 emissions through installing CCS facilities and using
biogenic resources.
United Kingdom
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Before submitting its first NDC in 2020, the UK had made
its commitments under the UNFCCC as part of the EU. The
UK has had comprehensive emission targets set by domestic
legislation since 2008, however, and withdrawal from the EU
does not appear to have changed its overall positioning as an
international leader. The legislation of the 2050 target for a UK
GHG reduction of at least 100% (i.e., net zero) (UK Government,
2019) has raised the profile of the debate around CDR, in the
UK often referred to as Greenhouse Gas Removal (GGR) to
keep open the possibility of non-CO2 approaches. CDR entered
the national political debate with the publication of the 2016
report “UKClimate Action following the Paris Agreement” by the
Committee on Climate Change (CCC) (Committee on Climate
Change, 2016). Before that, CDR was not explicitly addressed
as a topic but several initiatives indicated implicit CDR policy.
Reforestation was a policy topic in the UK early on after a history
of heavy deforestation. TheUK had integrated carbon storage as a
goal of forestry by 1994 and committed to create more woodland
in the context of climate targets in 2009 (Raum and Potter, 2015).
Increased tree planting became a high-profile campaign issue
during the 2019 election, with the environment, and carbon in
particular, highlighted as a key motivation.
Recently, some businesses and industries have promoted
geochemical-based CDR. Perhaps the most notable (in terms of
potential scale) is Drax, the UK’s largest thermal power station,
which is trialing carbon capture on its biomass-fired units with
the aim of becoming a BECCS facility. Other, smaller-scale CDR
start-ups are also emerging. Conclusions from the UK Citizens’
Assembly on Climate Change suggest a majority of the public
prefers ecosystem-based approaches to geochemical approaches.
There is however some support for research into “engineered”
CDR. Common concerns include CO2 leaks from storage and
that CDR fails to address the root cause of the problem (Climate
Assembly UK, 2020). Other UK surveys confirm this, and
suggest publics may not accept removal unless accompanied by
ambitious near-term emission reductions (Cox et al., 2020). The
position of UK ENGOs on CDR is rather mixed. Mitigation
deterrence is a concern, although at least some consider a need for
geochemical CDR alongside widespread emissions cuts (Friends
of the Earth, 2018).
CDR Accounting and Methods
In UK mitigation targets, emissions and removals are treated
equally in accounting and LULUCF sources and sinks are
included (UK Government, 2019). The legislation only mentions
the LULUCF sector in reference to removals which can be
accounted for in targets. This implies that any CDR reported
outside the LULUCF sector (e.g., BECCS, DACCS) would not be
included, however, an adjustment to the legislation would at least
in principle be simple.
Policy Instruments
The most developed area of policy relating to CDR in the UK
is for forestry. A framework for monitoring, reporting, and
verification (MRV) of voluntary actions to increase carbon in
forests has been developed as the Woodland Carbon Code.
Incentives exist in the form of grants and, more recently, the
Woodland Carbon Guarantee which provides long-term prices
for carbon credits. Several policies are in place to reduce the wider
negative impacts of these policies (UK Government, 2018).
Despite previous failed attempts to initiate CCS in the UK, the
government intends to deploy CCS at scale by the mid-2020s. It
has announced a CCS Infrastructure Fund of £1 billion to build
four clusters by 2030 (UKGovernment, 2020b). Support has been
given to several innovation projects, FEED studies and strategy
documents, and a consultation carried out on business models
to support different CCS applications, including BECCS. The
government has also announced it will invest £640 million in tree
planting and peatland restoration (i.e., enhanced soil carbon) in
England (UK Government, 2020a), is studying policy options to
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incentivise a range of CDRmethods (Vivid Economics, 2019) and
has noted its openness to considering future inclusion in carbon
pricing mechanisms. Up to £100m support for innovation in
CDR has been announced (UK Government, 2020a).
Expert Bodies and Science
The UK’s approach is guided substantially by the CCC. Its advice
emphasizes independent expertise and scenario building, with
the overall timing and scope of domestic action guided by global
pathways necessary to meet the Paris Agreement, taken primarily
from the IPCC’s SR1.5 (Committee on Climate Change, 2019).
The CCC is now analyzing CDR as a sector alongside other more
traditional sectors such as power and transport, and has offered
a package of policy recommendations (Committee on Climate
Change, 2020). The wider academic climate research community
has also been a key player in the debate. The UK research
councils have already funded one programme of CDR research
and are commissioning a new programme of demonstration. A
report on CDR was published by the Royal Society and Royal
Academy of Engineering in 2018 (Royal Society Royal Academy
of Engineering, 2018).
Developments in CDR Niches
In the UK, CDR niches are supported proactively by the
government. The substantial amounts of funding for research,
demonstrating, and deployments indicate that the UK intends
to develop into a frontrunner and a technology-provider in
the context of CDR. The government has stated “we want
the UK’s entrepreneurs, universities and engineering industries
to be well-placed to exploit the advantages of global demand
for these new technologies” (UK Government, 2017, p. 57).
Companies, including established businesses and start-ups, are
exploring CDR.
Australia
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Climate policy in Australia is a contested policy field, shaped by
high vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change on the one
hand and politically influential fossil fuel interests on the other.
Australia has a weak pledge for emissions reduction to the Paris
climate agreement (Den Elzen et al., 2019), with a commitment
to 26–28% reduction on 2005 levels by 2030, though eschewing
any formal commitment to a net zero target. The federal-
level reticence around climate targets is contrasted sharply by
all Australian states and territories, which have adopted net
zero by 2050 (or sooner) targets (Climate Council, 2020). The
issue of CDR has been implicitly present in Australia’s climate
policy for some time. After the publication of the King Review,
the Australian Government released its first Statement on the
Technology Investment Roadmap (Department of Industry,
Science, Energy and Resources, Australia, 2020c) in which
CDR was acknowledged. The statement outlines prioritized
technologies, notably including carbon capture and storage
(CCS) (plus compression, transport, etc.) explicitly justified by
the pursuit of negative emissions. The Statement also includes
prioritization of soil carbon, a watching brief on direct air capture
(DAC), and carbon capture and use (CCU) as an emerging
technology. NGOs and private sector actors have not engaged
substantively with CDR in public discourse (outside of the high-
profile debates about CCS). The changes in 2020 sit atop a
legacy of deeply contested climate policy in Australia (Crowley,
2017); a legacy which offers important context for CDR (Colvin
et al., 2020) and highlights the implicit governance of some CDR
approaches in Australia.
CDR Accounting and Methods
In the National Greenhouse Gas Inventory, emissions and
removals by sector including LULUCF, are aggregated to provide
a net-total for the country. Ecosystem-based CDR methods
are already an implicit part of the policy mix in Australia
and regarded as fungible with conventional mitigation. In
recent years, LULUCF contributed net-removals to Australia’s
total emissions (Department of Industry, Science, Energy and
Resources, Australia, 2020b). The centrality of technical methods,
particularly CCS, to the 2020 Statement further complicates how
CDR has entered Australia’s climate policy discourse. CCS in
Australia has been a critical technology underpinning “clean
coal” rhetoric, which was first advanced in the 1990s and
considered a delaying tactic for meaningful emissions reduction
(Marshall, 2016). Therefore, the promotion of CCS in 2020
initiative raises the potential that CDR will be perceived or used
as the latest iteration of emissions reduction delay.
Policy Instruments
The Climate Solutions/Emissions Reduction Fund (ERF) is
Australia’s primary climate policy instrument. This economy
wide abatement subsidy scheme was introduced in 2014, and
uses reverse auctions to “purchase carbon abatement at the
lowest per-unit cost” (Evans, 2018, p. 39). Under the ERF, CDR
has arguably been enacted in Australia via ecosystem-based
approaches such as soil carbon sequestration, tree planting, and
improved grazing practices (Department of Industry, Science,
Energy and Resources, Australia, 2020a). In Australia’s climate
policy discourse, many consider the ERF to be a suboptimal
policy option (Burke, 2016). It was part of the “Direct Action”
approach, implemented following repeal of Australia’s short-
lived carbon price. This “implementation and reversal” period
of climate policy (Chan, 2018, p. 302) was marked by negative
and divisive politics and well-financed and influential fossil
fuel industry campaigning (McKnight and Hobbs, 2018). The
consequence is that the divisive politics, the contested Direct
Action approach, and the forgone carbon price have fostered an
industry-first, climate-later view of the political intent of the ERF.
The government response to the King Review noted that
efforts to develop methods for including CCS & CCUS under the
ERF are in development (Australian Government, 2020). Due to
the fact that the ERF already includes carbon removal practices,
the regulatory effort to include geochemical-based CDR would
be comparatively low. Approaches under the ERF that may be
considered CDR have been positioned in the context of emissions
reductions (and now, climate solutions), rather than explicitly
as CDR.
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Expert Bodies and Science
The scientific community is increasingly engaging with the issue
of CDR (Australian Academy of Science, 2018; Dunne, 2018) and
an expert panel appointed by the government provided the King
Review (Carbon Abatement Panel, 2020), which noted the IPCC
and IEA regard negative emissions technologies as significant for
the Paris Agreement goals.
Developments in CDR Niches
Australia has an established sector focused on ecosystem-based
CDR (“carbon farming”) that has been engaging with the
ERF and voluntary markets (Evans, 2018). With regard to
geochemical-based CDR there are few early movers. Notably,
Mineral Carbonation International is an emerging Australian
company, and the key entity of CO2 Value Australia, a peak body
representing the nascent carbon utilization sector. The decision
to expand the scope for investment beyond renewable energy
to include low, zero, and negative emissions technologies of
the government agencies Climate Change Authority, Australian
Renewable Energy Agency and the Clean Energy Finance
Corporation may provide support for niche development.
Cooperation by research, industry, and the government may
guide the future development of CDR via the ERF and
Technology Investment Roadmap toward a productive policy
environment in which CDR is not in effect nor perception a
2020+ iteration of “clean coal” emissions reduction delay. CDR
as a climate-industry win-win may promote repair of destructive
climate politics and inadequate climate policy, and governance
via the existing ERF mechanism may accelerate implementation.
New Zealand
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
Climate policy in New Zealand to date has been shaped by a
strong focus on a price-based, least cost approach to mitigation,
combined with the significant economic role of the primary
(land-use) sector with high emissions from agriculture and
removals from afforestation. CDR from afforestation has been
integral to New Zealand’s conceptualization of climate change
targets and policy from the early 1990s, recognizing that gross
CO2 emissions were projected to increase, but an increasing
forest sink would partly compensate for this growth. New
Zealand strongly argued for inclusion of carbon sinks in the
design of the Kyoto Protocol and the formulation of gross-net
emission targets. The domestic debate remained during the late
1990s and early 2000s about the most appropriate incentives for
enhancing forest sinks.
Afforestation remains a significant element of New Zealand’s
approach to meeting its NDC and 2050 emission targets as it
provides a comparatively cheap and significant carbon sink7.
Despite initial concerns in the 1990s, the forestry industry is
broadly supportive of plantation forests receiving units that can
be traded in the emissions trading scheme (ETS). However,
different groups in NZ are increasingly expressing concern.
7The net zero target covers all gases other than biogenic methane (for NZ,
essentially CO2 and N2O). For biogenic methane, the government has set a
separate reduction target range of−24 to−47% reduction by 2050 based on IPCC
SR1.5.
Rural community groups are concerned about the potential
loss of employment, population and associated effects on the
community and services if widespread afforestation occurs
at the expense of sheep and extensive beef farms (Harrison
and Bruce, 2019). Some rural advocates regard the significant
reliance on afforestation as evidence of a rural/urban split,
i.e., urban elites evading the need to reduce their own (gross)
emissions by relying on carbon sequestration occurring on the
backs of rural communities. Environmental NGOs are primarily
concerned that excessive reliance on CDRmay lead to mitigation
obstruction, along with risks to the permanence of forest sinks.
Other concerns relate to the dominance of an introduced tree
species (Pinus radiata) and only limited support for biodiversity
goals that could be derived from slower growing native forests.
CDR Accounting and Methods
CO2 removals are treated as fully equivalent to CO2 abatement,
not only in how they are defined and used to account for emission
targets but also in terms of policy settings. It is therefore seen
as a perfectly valid and fungible integrated component of the
country’s overall mitigation strategy. Other types of CDR are
not being seriously discussed. There is growing interest in the
farming sector to recognize carbon sequestration in soils, but
insufficient science to support adoption of this method. There
is a notable absence of serious discussion of BECCS, given
the potentially suitable land, coupled with very limited biofuel
policies compared to EU countries (Wreford et al., 2019). After
several abandoned attempts to introduce price based policies,
New Zealand introduced an emissions trading scheme in 2008. In
this ETS, CO2 emissions and removals from forestry are treated
as fully equivalent to emissions or avoided emissions from gross
emitters, to our knowledge the only ETS at national scale to do
so. This use of afforestation CDR is consistent with a dominant
least-cost principle to climate policy in New Zealand.
Policy Instruments
This primary price-based policy is complemented by a number
of additional government programmes, most recently the One
Billion Trees programme that seeks to accelerate forest planting
for both climate and non-climate benefits such as erosion
control and biodiversity through cash grants and technical
support. The Billion Trees programme calls for “the right tree
in the right place,” reflecting concerns regarding widespread
tree monocultures creeping across extensive but productive
farmland (Ministry for Primary Industries, New Zealand, 2020).
Suggestions are also being made to limit the rate of carbon-
price driven afforestation by allowing local government to
control plantations using existing environmental (non-climate)
legislation. A further point of concern, raised mainly by
stakeholders from the agriculture sector, is that New Zealand
chose relatively restrictive parameters for what land qualifies as
forest and hence can be recognized for afforestation, including
a minimum area of 1 hectare and a minimum width of 30m.
Work programmes have been initiated to consider options to
recognize the carbon being sequestered in smaller-scale plantings
on farmland, especially if agricultural non-CO2 emissions (which
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are currently excluded from climate policy) become exposed to
emission prices as currently planned by 2025.
Expert Bodies and Science
The integration of CDR into the policy mix has been
driven primarily by government officials with support from
scientists, in what may be called a technocratic approach
to policy development initially (Rimmer, 2016). Policymakers
and experts followed the view that “net emissions is what
the atmosphere sees.” This first-principles lens readily leads
to treating carbon removals as fungible with gross emissions.
Subsequent scientific criticism of the consequences of this
approach (e.g., Parliamentary Comissioner for the Environment,
New Zealand, 2019), covering the range of concerns noted
above, has not been sufficient to change the overall framework.
Impermanence was seen as an insufficient argument against the
use of forest sinks, it only indicated the need for policies that
provide accountability for subsequent emissions if and when
they occurred. The IPCC SR1.5 strongly facilitated the adoption
of the net zero target for long-lived gases in New Zealand but
did not fundamentally change the CDR policy debate, apart
from an increasing recognition of the scale of afforestation and
potential for negative side-effects if emissions and removals are
priced consistent with that target (Productivity Commission,
New Zealand, 2018; Ministry for the Environment, New Zealand,
2019; Parliamentary Comissioner for the Environment, New
Zealand, 2019).
Developments in CDR Niches
As afforestation has a well-established and low-cost role in the
policy mix, activity in CDR niches is rather low. Industry interest
in CCS exists but is strongly linked with enhanced oil recovery
and not seen as industry opening up a more general option
to pursue geochemical CDR at scale. Claims and interests in
CDR via soil carbon are generally seen as speculative for the
near and even medium term, but are the focus of increased
government funding for research. This is, however, in part a
preparation and insurance for future accounting requirements,
not necessarily a goal of developing a new CDR option. While
there has been some interest, biofuels policy is limited compared
to EU countries (Wreford et al., 2019), and BECCS attracts no
significant attention in the national debate.
USA
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
CDR remains a nascent, yet relatively bipartisan, political issue
in the US. National electoral politics in the US, expressed
most recently in the 2020 Presidential election, typically focus
on the validity of climate change science and modifying the
climate policy tools implemented by former-President Barack
Obama. Legislatively, most national Democrats (one of two
major political parties in the US) are focused on the Trump
administration’s weakening of environmental regulations, and
formation of post-2020 climate policy under a Democratic Biden
administration. Early decisions and announcements indicate that
CDR will continue to move up the US climate agenda over the
coming years. So far, CDR has been discussed in US national
politics in two forums: ENGOs, and the Congress.
The US currently has no economy wide emissions target.
The new Biden-Harris administration, however, has re-joined
the Paris Agreement and will therefore have to provide a new
NDC. With regard to a long-term target, the Biden-Harris
administration raised expectations toward the adoption of a net
zero emissions target in one of the early executive orders (The
White House, 2021). The US’ first NDC was an economy-wide
reduction of GHG emissions by 26–28% below 2005 levels in
2025. CDR played a relatively small role in this NDC, primarily
through inclusion of a robust sink of CO2 in the LULUCF sector.
Most US ENGOs, think tanks, trade groups, and philanthropy
have been largely supportive of research, development, and
deployment of CDR. ENGOs supporting carbon removal have
tended to be relatively technology-agnostic, supporting both
ecosystem-and geochemical-based methods. A small minority
of US ENGOs oppose CDR, primarily “technological” forms of
removal such as DACCS. Much of this opposition stems from
opposition to CCS as mitigation option for fossil fuel technology.
A core area of disagreement between these groups and other
ENGOs is whether geochemical-based carbon removal can be a
just and progressive form of climate action (Buck, 2019).
CDR Accounting and Methods
In its first NDC, the US intended to include all categories of
emissions by sources and removals by sinks, to account for
the LULUCF sector using a net-net approach, and to use a
“production approach” to account for harvested wood products
consistent with IPCC guidance. Arguments for carbon removal
in the US tend to embrace the essential role of carbon removal
in achieving climate change goals, technology innovation,
sustainable agriculture, and job creation (Energy Futures
Initiative, 2019; Friedmann, 2019). These innovation-centric
framings span both ecosystem- and geochemical-based CDR
methods (Larsen et al., 2019). Relatively few actors promoting
CDR have adapted framings around equity and justice, despite
its prominence in current US climate policy debates.
Policy Instruments
CDR has featured prominently in modest climate policy
passed between 2016 and 2020. One prominent example of
bipartisan legislation is the Agriculture Improvement Act,
known commonly as the 2018 Farm Bill. This omnibus
bill provides roughly half a trillion dollars in funding for
various USDA functions over a period of 5 years through
crop insurance, conservation payments, and loan support
(Congressional Research Service, 2018). In a departure from
historical precedent, the 2018 Farm Bill establishes a variety of
new research programs, funding opportunities, and task forces
to aid the development and deployment of a wide range of
CDR methods. CDR provisions fall into four main titles: (1)
Conservation, (2) Research, Extension, and Related Matters, (3)
Forestry, and (4) Energy. Within these new provisions, the 2018
Farm Bill supports and incentivizes research on ecosystem-based
(soils, forestry, and grazing management), hybrid (bioenergy and
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biogas/renewable natural gas), and geochemical-based (carbon
utilization) CDR methods (Jacobson and Sanchez, 2019).
Not explicitly introduced as CDR policy, but relevant for
geochemical-based or hybrid methods is the 45Q tax credit
for sequestration of qualified carbon oxides, adopted in 2009.
The tax credit is available for 12 years to projects. Several
dozen US CCS projects have been announced in part because
of the enhanced 45Q tax credit (Clean Air Task Force,
2020), and CDR projects are expected to calculate with the
tax credited.
Finally, the Energy Act of 2020, a bipartisan renewable
energy bill passed at the end of 2020, contains several
provisions to promote CDR. These include establishment of
an interagency CDR research program, a prize competition
for direct air capture, and allocation of funds for carbon
removal, carbon utilization, and carbon sequestration projects.
The bill was adopted by bipartisan majorities in both houses
of Congress.
Policy instruments to promote CDR have emerged in
recent Congressional legislation. These instruments are primarily
allocations and appropriations for research and development,
and demonstration. Others make small modifications to existing
regulations to promote CDR. Such proposals often enjoy
bipartisan support in the US, particularly in the Senate. CDR
proposals were also included in the platforms of numerous
Democrats vying for their party’s Presidential nomination in
2020. The platforms prominently emphasized ecosystem-based
CDR approaches such as regenerative agriculture. The new
administration is expected to follow-up on these and develop new
CDR initiatives.
Expert Bodies and Science
Due to the negative view of the past administration ofmultilateral
fora and scientific expertise on climate change, the IPCC SR1.5
did not play an important role in US climate policy. But the
scientific community as well as experts from think tanks and
ENGOs are increasingly engaged in CDR debates. As discussed
above, most ENGOs in the US have been largely supportive of
research, development, and deployment of CDR and contribute
to the CDR debate. Prominent themes emphasized include
the necessity of CDR in climate action, economic opportunity,
and innovation.
Developments in CDR Niches
Specific deployment opportunities for CDR in the US are
still emerging. Nevertheless, deployment prospects are strong
due to the US’ particular strength in science and engineering,
as well as suitable geography for demonstration and early
deployment (Sanchez et al., 2018). State level technology and
policy opportunities are beginning to materialize at the State
and regional scale. Furthermore, start-ups are emerging and
prominent technology companies, such as Microsoft and Apple,
have made commitments to support and invest in CDR;
developments that are likely to be accelerated by the more
prominent role for CDR in the new administration.
SYNTHESIS
The case studies show the multiplicity and varieties of ways CDR
is beginning to be, or already is, part of existing climate policy
mixes. Even in these countries—which were selected because they
already address the CDR in some form—considerable differences
in the pace and forms of acknowledging and governing CDR are
observed. While CDR policy has already been adopted in some
cases for quite some time, in others it is currently being shaped
by political positioning of different actors. In order to identify
differences and patterns of CDR policy making, we organize the
synthesis along the five dimensions of the analytical framework
presented in Table 1. Based on these findings, we develop a
conceptual typology of the observed varieties and patterns. It is
our intention that the contribution of a first attempt of organizing
current developments into a conceptual frame will spur work on
more fine-grained comparisons and prospects for CDR policy.
Institutional Setting, Actors, and Coalitions
In all nine case studies, climate policy is a well-institutionalized
policy domain with clearly-defined actors, political positions
and path-dependencies. The countries differ, however, in the
ambition and design of emissions reduction targets. They also
choose different policy instruments andmeasures to achieve their
commitments. It can be observed that net zero targets—which
began to diffuse into domestic climate politics after the macro-
political changes of the adoption of the Paris Agreement and the
IPCC SR1.5—facilitated or gave new importance to CDR debates.
Australia and the US are the only countries in this selection that
do not currently (January 2021) have a formally adopted net zero
emissions target of some kind at national level.
The existing net zero targets differ substantially in their scope
and timing. Whereas most countries address all GHG emissions,
New Zealand for example, excludes biogenic methane from its
net zero ambition. Questions of target design have a significant
impact on the amount of residual emissions that need to be
balanced by CDR to achieve net zero (McLaren et al., 2019;
Fridahl et al., 2020), and are therefore an important overarching
dimension of CDR policies.
Between Highlighting and Kicking off CDR Policies
After the Paris Agreement
The developments in Australia, the UK, and New Zealand show
that domestic climate policies aiming at deliberately balancing
emissions with removals to achieve mitigation targets is not
only a post-Paris development. Although pre-Paris CDR policies
were not directly framed as a tool to compensate for residual
gross emissions, they aimed at incentivising different actors to
enhance the LULUCF sink to help achieve mitigation targets
at lower costs. In these countries, the Paris Agreement brought
new attention to an already existing strand of climate policy.
In the other cases, the emergence of CDR policies is closely
connected with the macro-political change represented by the
Paris Agreement. Here, CDR in the pre-Paris era was, if at all,
regulated implicitly. Public policy on explicitly regulating and
incentivising additional removals and accounting them toward
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domestic mitigation targets only kicked off in connection with or
in the aftermath of adopting net zero targets.
Business and Industry
The positioning and engagement of business and industry actors
reflects the variety of current status and prospects of CDR in
each country. In cases where the LULUCF sinks are already
routinely counted toward mitigation targets, the forestry and
to some extent agriculture sector generally supports the use
of ecosystem-based CDR (i.e., New Zealand, the UK, and
Australia), as well as existing or new initiatives to reward CDR.
In the UK and the US, geochemical-based CDR methods are
getting increasing attention by business actors. Also in Sweden
and Ireland, the business sector is generally in support of
the recent domestic CDR initiatives; some actors are directly
involved in exploring business cases and actual deployment.
Whereas businesses in Ireland are focused on ecosystem-
based methods, Swedish companies are involved in a wider
range of CDR approaches. In Norway, the fossil and energy-
intensive industries are, supported by the government, engaged
in deploying and promoting a CCS infrastructure relevant for
durably storing domestic and imported CO2 that could support
a future expansion of geochemical-based CDR. In Germany,
the industry is rather reluctant with regard to CDR; early
collaborations between industry and CDR companies, however,
signal a potential change.
Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations
How ENGOs approach CDR policy also differs significantly
and can be conceptualized as a continuum between suspicion
and agnosticism. In the EU and its Member States, their
position is primarily driven by suspicion that integrating CDR
in the climate regime obstructs necessary changes to reduce
gross emissions. Although the need for CDR is increasingly
accepted and addressed by ENGOs, geochemical-based methods
are a particular source of concern. In the US, ENGOs are
mostly technology-agnostic, some support geochemical-based
CDR proactively. In New Zealand, Norway, and the UK, the
picture is rather mixed; whereas some ENGOs are skeptical
especially of geochemical-based CDR or approaches that threaten
biodiversity, others do acknowledge the need for CDR. In New
Zealand, civil society also highlights a rural/urban conflict; rural
communities are critical of the idea that they should live with the
socio-economic consequences of land-use change to balance on-
going emissions caused in cities. In Australia, ENGOs have not
engaged substantially nor explicitly on CDR.
CDR Accounting and Methods
The accounting of CDR varies between full equivalence and
reluctance to aggregate emissions and removals. In Australia,
New Zealand, and the UK, LULUCF removals are regarded as
fungible8 with gross emissions to achieve climate targets. There
is currently no cap on the amount of removals that can be used
to achieve the domestic targets. This is in contrast to the EU and
8We use the term “fungible” to express that CDR and emissions reduction are
interchangeable and mutual substitutes in accounting practices of mitigation
targets.
Norway, where policymakers have so far been rather reluctant to
account for large shares of LULUCF sinks toward their mitigation
targets. Recent policy initiatives, however, are inducing change.
At the Member State level, Sweden has adopted a net zero
target with two components: a minimum amount of emissions
reductions and maximum amount of CDR in combination
with international offsets, so-called supplementary measures. In
Ireland, land use sinks were tacitly used to balance emissions
from ruminant agriculture, but emerging climate legislation gives
new and more explicit importance to removals. Germany has not
pursued efforts to integrate removals in their mitigation target,
but a net target at EU-level would affect German accounting
practices as well.
Differentiating CDR Methods
Different CDR methods attract varying degrees of attention
in the analyzed set of countries. While specific definitions
and attribution of methods to categories of “natural” and
“technological” methods are contingent and in flux, the general
distinction shapes the public policy processes and societal debates
in all cases. In the UK, Sweden, and Norway geochemical-based
methods are proactively addressed, as in Australia and the US
though to a more limited extent. In Germany, all methods that
include CCS are highly contested in the societal debate. At the
EU level, a need for geochemical-based CDR is acknowledged by
the European Commission, but the policy initiatives announced
so far focus on ecosystem-based CDR. All eight case studies have
policy debates or pursue initiatives linked to ecosystem-based
CDR in one way or the other, especially afforestation.
The Changing Political Status of Forestry
The comparison across the cases indicates that the role of forestry
in climate policy is changing, a change facilitated by integrating
CDR into climate policy. The countries differ in the degree to
which forestry is accounted toward climate targets. Especially
in those countries that aggregate emissions and removals and
account for the forest sink in mitigation targets, forestry and its
capacity to remove CO2 is a key component of climate policy.
Other countries, like the EU and its Member States, for example,
just launched political initiatives for considering the full LULUCF
sink in the context of their mitigation targets and thereby give
new importance to forestry in climate policy making. In line with
recent findings on the history of carbon removal (Carton et al.,
2020) and a review of policy tools (vonHedemann et al., 2020)
we find that the political status of the LULUCF sink, and forestry
in particular, has changed with the emergence of CDR policies,
legitimizing the use of LULUCF in some countries while raising
questions about the scale and practices of afforestation in others.
Future work on CDR policy should therefore analyze the political
drivers and implications of these shifts.
Policy Instruments: Between Trading,
Rewarding, and R&D
The comparison of CDR-related policy instruments reveals three
key groups. The first consists of different policy approaches for
mitigation instruments that fully integrate removals. Examples
of this are the Australian reverse auction scheme under the
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Emissions Reduction Fund, or the emission trading scheme
in New Zealand, that treat emissions and removals as fully
equivalent. With its separate net zero target, Sweden is a special
case: its policies to incentivize and instigate deployment of
geochemical-based and ecosystem-based CDR are structurally
linked to the overall climate target, but are largely independent
from conventional mitigation policies.
A second group of instruments is composed of rewarding
schemes to incentivize CDR, which are not directly linked
to or integrated with climate policy instruments targeting
conventional mitigation. Examples are the Woodland Carbon
Guarantee in the UK, or the US 45Q Tax Credit. Incentive
structures aiming to enhance the LULUCF sink through
afforestation or rewetting of drained peatlands outside emissions
pricing policies are also established in New Zealand, Norway,
Ireland, and Sweden. In Norway and the UK, the efforts to
establish a CCS infrastructure by industry and political actors
are increasingly framed as CDR-relevant, although questions of
their actual accounting are not yet decided. In general, it can
be observed that already existing non-integrated instruments
targeting CDR received substantially more attention after the
adoption of the Paris Agreement than before. In addition,
many new initiatives and policy instruments were proposed and
adopted since then.
A third group of policy instruments contains R&D
funding initiatives that mostly target geochemical-based
CDR approaches. However, as mentioned above, definitions
of CDR are in flux—especially in the context of researching
new approaches. One major difference across the cases is the
degree to which the research funding targets deployment of
geochemical-based CDR. In the UK, Sweden, and Australia,
research funding targets a wide range of CDR approaches,
including funds for demonstration and deployment of the
geochemical-based methods. The EU Innovation Fund and
Norway’s support for CDR-related R&D in the context of
CCS infrastructure are pointing in a similar direction. CDR
research is also part of a large Farming Bill adopted in 2018 in
the US. The US supports and incentivizes research on a broad
portfolio of CDR methods. R&D as well as demonstration and
deployment funding is expected to increase substantially in the
coming years. Similarly, in Germany, the government decided
to create two large CDR research funding lines from 2021
onwards—deployment, however, is not a specific objective here.
The Role of Experts and Science
In all case studies, scientific expertise is important for initiating
and developing CDR policies. CDR entered the public policy
decision making processes through a rather technocratic
approach. Scientific experts and specialized policymakers in
the administrations have been key actors in pursuing CDR
integration. The public debate is—compared to other climate
policy related issues—almost non-existent except where it is
linked with wider land management practices. The IPCC’s SR1.5
and follow-up publications by national science advisory bodies
in particular, however, elevated the issue of CDR on the agenda
of think tanks, policymakers, NGOs etc.
National modeling studies increasingly address possible
compositions ofmid-century residual emissions and the amounts
and types of CDR required to balance them. The need for at least
some countries to achieve domestic net-negative GHG emissions,
however—a necessary part of Paris Agreement’s global long-term
temperature target of well below 2◦C while pursuing 1.5◦C—
is still only addressed by small groups of scientific experts and
narrow policy circles. Despite the fact that OECD countries can
be argued to have a particular responsibility for achieving net-
negative emissions (Robiou Du Pont et al., 2017; Fyson et al.,
2020; Pozo et al., 2020), the issue is only rarely and briefly
addressed in emerging policy initiatives and could be argued to
be actively disabled by a focus on net zero emission targets.
Developments in CDR Niches
Developments in the niches range from very small start-up
initiatives with low support to proactive support for large CDR
initiatives by industrial actors. Across the case study countries,
we observe very different actors engaged in the protective spaces
of CDR development. Among them: energy sector companies in
the UK and Sweden, fossil fuel, and energy-intensive industries
in Norway, and start-ups in Australia, the US and the UK.
The niches are protected in various ways and to different
degrees: Most prominently, the UK support for innovation
exemplifies how a government tries to strategically position
itself as a frontrunner and technology-provider. In Norway,
the government also proactively supports innovations in CDR-
related initiatives, both in terms of developing, but also politically
in the form of advocating the EU to support export of CO2 to
Norway. Together with Sweden, where especially innovations in
and deployment of BECCS are supported by the government,
this group of countries engage in “nurturing” and “empowering”
(Smith and Raven, 2012) CDR development and deployment.
In the other countries, niche developments are not supported
in such a proactive way but are generally limited to incentives
or research funding. However, in New Zealand for example,
path-dependent reliance on incumbent CDR regimes can actively
reduce incentives to invest in the proactive development of
additional CDR approaches.
VARIETIES OF INTEGRATING CDR INTO
CLIMATE POLICY: TOWARD A TYPOLOGY
The synthesis provided an overview of the varieties of CDR
policymaking in the countries. While the peculiarities of
individual cases became particularly clear, in a second step
we are attempting to identify broader patterns of CDR policy
making and develop an analytical typology. In doing so, we
follow the MLP of socio-technical transitions, where identifying
typologies of transitions is a common tool to conceptualize
commonalities and differences across case studies (Smith et al.,
2005; Geels and Schot, 2007; Geels et al., 2016). This work
is an important reminder of the fact that transitions are not
“teleological or deterministic, but continuously enacted by and
contested between a variety of actors” (Geels et al., 2016, p.
900). Shifts between different types are of course possible (Geels
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et al., 2016), for example, if societal power structures and political
alliances change (Hess, 2014).
In a first step of conceptualizing our findings, we propose
five key dimensions to aggregate varieties of CDR policymaking.
Each dimension represents a continuum of manifestations that
we identified across the cases (see Table 2). It is important to
note that these continua are drawn from the synthesis of case
studies, and we do not intend for them to represent a definitive
nor exhaustive coverage of all possible CDR policy making
dynamics. However, we believe these are a useful representation
as a first step to carve out differences and commonalities between
political approaches toward CDR and therefore a useful step
to develop a typology of CDR policymaking that may enable
future comparative analysis of other countries and across policy
domains and support analysis of change in CDR policy making
dynamics over time.
In a second step, we use the five dimensions and continua
to build a three-tiered typology on how CDR is currently
being addressed and integrated in climate policy regimes. The
types are idealized; differences are deliberately overstated in
order to support analytical clarity9. Their main utility is to
illustrate divergent possible policy approaches toward CDR that
we observed in the case studies. Based on the continua observed
in the case studies, we attempt to identify the conceptually
most distinctive types of how CDR is approached. In reality,
countries might lean to one or the other type, but do not
necessarily match all typical characteristics or may represent
hybrids. In actual CDR policymaking, boundaries are blurry and
overlaps exist. Furthermore, shifts between the different types
and developing new types is possible over time; discussions about
which direction to follow in CDR policymaking is expected to
be politically contested. Identifying these conceptual types is,
however, a way of further synthesizing the knowledge gathered
through empirical case studies. It may inform future comparative
work on CDR policy as well as spur a debate about possible and
plausible developments in future CDR policy. These types are not
formulated as a finite result. Future work, e.g., on a different set
of countries might identify important amendments and additions
to this typology.
Table 3 and Figure 1 provide an overview of the three
conceptual types of CDR policymaking; the following sections
describe the three types in more detail and give an overview of
9Identifying typologies has a long tradition in social science more generally. For
a discussion of methodological merits and criticisms in political science, see e.g.,
Steinberger (1980), Smith (2002), Elman (2005), Collier et al. (2012).




The type of incremental modification is shaped by a restrained
approach toward integrating CDR into existing climate policy
instruments to address the need to balance residual emissions.
These incremental steps to integrate CDR are shaped by rather
strict separations between emission reductions and removals
in the accounting toward mitigation targets. CDR policies
and policy instruments linked to conventional mitigation are
also strictly separated. Over time, the incremental opening
could lead to an advancing integration of removal and
reduction instruments.
Incumbent actors do not ignore the need for CDR completely;
in particular, macro-political developments toward the new
importance of sinks puts pressure on the climate policy regime.
In this context, their incremental approach leads to a step
by step integration of ecosystem-based CDR approaches. With
regard to policy instruments, a cautious opening toward CDR is
characteristic for this type, allowing for accounting of a limited
amount of ecosystem-based CDR. Regarding geochemical-based
CDR, the focus is on RD&D. Support for new CDR methods in
small niches and their deployment, however, is limited; research
funding is the only support for them.
Early Integration and Fungibility of
Emission Reductions and Removals
In this type, CDR is already part of the climate policy
regime. Even before macro-political developments such as the
Paris Agreement and the diffusion of long-term net zero
targets, fungibility of emissions and removals was established.
Established policies reflect the assumption that “net emissions
is what the atmosphere sees.” Since the Paris Agreement,
incumbent actors give more attention toward CDR; policymakers
and other actors are now exploring options to foster and expand
CDR’s role in achieving long-term goals.
This type is characterized by the fact that ecosystem-based
removals are fully integrated in policy instruments such as
emission trading schemes or reverse auctions. Geochemical-
based CDR would—from a sheer regulatory point of view—be
comparatively easy to integrate, especially because the share of
CDR that can be used to achieve climate targets is not limited in
this type. Because CDR approaches are already part of a stable
TABLE 2 | Five dimensions of CDR policy making and continua of observed manifestations.
Dimensions Continua
CDR in mitigation targets Fungible Strictly separated
View of CDR among actors of the incumbent regime Proactive integration Restrained integration
CDR methods addressed Only ecosystem-based Wide range of methods
Relation of CDR policy instruments to broader climate policy mix Incremental opening Full integration
Government support for developing CDR niches Limited support Nurturing and empowering
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TABLE 3 | Three types of integrating CDR into climate policy.
I. Incremental
modification




CDR in mitigation targets Strictly separated Fungible Fungible
View of CDR among actors of the incumbent regime Restrained integration Proactive integration Proactive integration
CDR methods addressed Ecosystem-based only Focus on ecosystem-based Proactive technology support
Relation of CDR policy instruments to broader climate policy mix Incremental opening Full integration Specific instruments
Government support for developing CDR niches Limited support Limited support Nurturing and empowering
FIGURE 1 | Three types of integrating CDR into climate policy.
climate policy regime and macro-political changes did not put
pressure on the regime in countries of this type, developments in
niches and their support is not very pronounced.
Proactive CDR Entrepreneurship
The political envisioning of a net zero emissions society is
directly linked to the deployment of CDR in the type of
proactive CDR policy entrepreneurship10. The incumbent actors
address the need to integrate and deploy CDR and pursue the
reorientation and opening-up of current conventional mitigation
climate policies proactively. In comparison to other types, niches
of radical geochemical-based CDR innovations are deliberately
nurtured and empowered. In general, CDR policy is open to a
wide range of CDR methods.
In contrast to the early integration type, CDR-specific
policy instruments are being developed (e.g., reverse auction
or financial rewarding schemes) which are not fully integrated
into conventional mitigation policy instruments. This is not
only because of path-dependencies created by existing policy
10The term “policy entrepreneur” describes “their willingness to invest their
resources—time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money—in the hope of a
future return” in public policy making Kingdon (1995, p. 122).
instruments, but also because incumbent actors follow the
objective of supporting the CDR development and deployment
specifically. Being perceived as a frontrunner in changing macro-
political contexts as well as a technology provider through
developing and deploying CDR technologies and exploring
business cases is one of the political objectives of the incumbent
actors in this third idealized type of CDR policymaking.
Typical Cases and Hybrids
If we try to locate our case studies on this spectrum of varieties of
CDR policy making, they can be differentiated between typical
cases and hybrids. The UK can be described as a typical case
for the type of proactive CDR policy entrepreneurship. None of
the other countries studied have such explicit policy support for
the development and deployment of various CDR measures. To
a limited extent, policy entrepreneurship can also be identified
in the European Union. However, the initiatives come mainly
from within the European Commission; only the coming years
will show how the Member States position themselves. Within
the EU, Sweden is the country with the most specific and
advanced CDR policy and shows policy entrepreneurship. Its
regulative approach of separating reductions and removals as
well as long-lasting debates on LULUCF removals, however,
indicate overlaps to the types of incremental modification as
well as early integration and fungibility. In Norway, we observe
policy entrepreneurship with regard to CCS, a key component
of several geochemical CDR approaches. Initiatives for specific
CDR policies, however, are so far limited and emerging only
incrementally. The new US administration is expected to
establish and develop specific CDR policies in the coming
years. With respect to geochemical-based CDR in particular, the
US is signaling that it is striving to be perceived and act as
a frontrunner.
Australia and New Zealand are typical cases for the early
integration and fungibility type. Both integrated CDR into their
domestic policy before the recently rising attention toward
these measures. In addition, both policy-designs are shaped by
fungibility of emissions and removals. Some aspects of this type
are also to be found in the case study of Ireland. At the same time,
however, we also observe aspects of incremental modification
in Ireland. Germany is a typical case for this third type of
incremental modification. Although actual integration of CDR
into the climate policy mix is almost absent so far, the societal
and political debate is increasingly opening toward CDR.
It is important to highlight that this assessment can only
be a snapshot. How CDR is approached politically is currently
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contested and will be subject to political struggles in the future.
Future work on comparing CDR policy approaches should
therefore not only extend the list of countries but also assess how
the countries initially studied for this project are developing. The
cases identified as hybrids are of particular interest—an in-depth
analysis of the dynamics currently taking place, including the
opportunity to reveal emerging new political approaches to CDR,
would be an important contribution to the emerging literature
on CDR.
CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis of nine empirical case studies we analyzed
the varieties of CDR policymaking and provide a snapshot
of a rapidly developing policy field. Based on the analytical
framework that tries to bridge insights from the multi-level
perspective on socio-technical transitions and the emerging
literature on CDR policy and governance, we tracked the
developments across these cases. The synthesis of this rich
empirical material reveals substantial differences as well as
commonalities across the cases. In an attempt to conceptualize
different patterns of CDR policymaking, we identified five
dimensions of CDR policymaking and proposed three idealized
types of CDR policy making: (1) incremental modification,
(2) early integration and fungibility, and (3) proactive CDR
policy entrepreneurship.
It is important to note that boundaries of these idealized types
are blurry; in the real-world, specific cases do not necessarily
match all characteristics of one type and hybrids exist. In
addition, countries can shift between different types over time
and new types might emerge. Such an evolution is expected
not only because policies and approaches are expected to
evolve, but also because CDR policies are contested as political
actors struggle for different prospects of governing CDR. These
drivers are capable of re-directing current developments in CDR
policymaking toward different or entirely new types of CDR
policy and governance.
The proposed conceptualization helps to synthesize the
knowledge collected through the case studies and illustrates
divergent possible approaches. As a conceptual typology,
however, it is reductionist and does not cover all dimensions
relevant to regulating CDR. Despite these limitations, this initial
work on comparing CDR policymaking and conceptualizing
different analytical types might spur future, more fine-
grained work, including comparing different sets of countries,
investigating in-depth single case studies and tracking changes
in CDR policymaking over time.
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